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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
ALLEN-HOWE SPECIALTIES CORP.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPBLLAMT

v.
U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
corporation, JACOBS ENGINEERING
Co., a corporation, and WYOMING
MINERAL CORPORATION, a corporation:

Case No. 16209

Defendants and Respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit by a building subcontractor
against the building owner, the project engineer, and the
general contractor to recover the subcontractor's greatly
increased costs that resulted from the general
contractor's errors and from the engineer's mismanagement
of the project.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The plaintiff-subcontractor is appealing from a
summary judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, The Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding,
dismissing all but one of its claims.

Plaintiff

voluntarily dismissed its claims against Kennecott Copper
Corporation, and the claims of Count VII of the
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complaint.

Those claims are not involved in this appeal.

In addition, the remaining defendants have admitted
liability under one of plaintiff's counts (Count III) and
that count is not involved in this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the summary
judgment entered below in favor of defendants and a remand
to the district court for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action by a building subcontractor to
recover approximately sixty-four thousand dollars incurred
as a result of the errors, delay and inefficiency of a
poorly-managed construction project.

The job was the

construction of a large and sophisticated uranium
extraction plant for Wyoming Mineral Corporation (a
subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Corporation) on land
leased from Kennecott Copper Corporation at the mouth of
Bingham Canyon, Utah. (R. 2).
Plaintiff Allen-Howe Specialties Corporation
(•plaintiff") is a steel erection subcontractor that
provided the skilled craftsmen necessary to erect the
steel building that houses the uranium extraction plant.
Plaintiff was responsbile to the general contractor, U.S.
Construction, Inc.

("U.S. Contruction") which, in turn,

was responsible to the project engineer, Jacobs
Engineering Company ("Jacobs Engineering").
-

2 -
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Management and scheduling of the project were
extremely critical because of the large pieces of
equipment that had to be incorporated into the building,
the small and crowded job site, the large nuaber of
different crafts used on the project, and the liaited ttae
for construction.
at 5-13, 45-46).
the beginning.

(R. 240 at 39-40, 72-73, 84-85; R. 239
The project fell behind schedule froa

Part of the delay was due to changes in

the project plans and specifications.

(R. 238 at 82).

Part was due to bad weather hindering the pouring of the
concrete foundation that had to be in place before
plaintiff could begin work.
93).

Part was due to

u.s.

(R. 239 at 43-447 R. 240 at

Construction's delay in

painting the structural steel and delivering it to the
site.

(R. 238 at 83: R. 239 at 44).

Part was due to

u.s.

Construction's sandblasting away the identifying markings
on the structural steel.

(R.238 at 82-83).

The result of

these delays was that as plaintiff was beginning work, the
project was already four weeks behind schedule.

(R.

239

at 45).
In order to keep the start-up delay from delaying
completion of the project, Jacobs Engineering scheduled
more simultaneous work by different crafts on the crowded
construction site.

(R. 240 at 72-73, 84).

The result, of

course, was that the various crafts interferred with each
other, requiring plaintiff to spend substantially more
- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hours

and more money -- on the job than foreseen.

(Id.; R. 237, ex. D-34).
For example, plaintiff anticipated that the
building's interior steel sheeting could be installed at
the rate of 2.25 man-hours per square.

Near the end of

the project, when the sheeting was actually installed, the
interference from equipment and other workmen was so
intense that six to seven man-hours were required per
square.

(R. 237, ex. D-34).

The interference restricted

the use of scaffolding, required plaintiff's employees to
move the scaffolding frequently, and restricuted the
proper deployment of materials, all of which greatly
increased labor costs.

(Id.)

In addition to the problem of interference from
other crafts, errors by

u.s.

Construction caused massive

amounts of wasted time and, hence, higher labor costs.
For example, some of the structural steel members would
not fit together, some were not identified because

u.s.

Construction sandblasted away or painted over the
identifying marks applied at the factory, and a number of
threaded fasteners were painted by mistake and had to be
cleaned and rethreaded before they could be used.

(R. 238

at 83, 84, 125).
The Complaint raises several theories on which
plaintiff is entitled to recover its losses from U.S.
Construction, Jacobs Engineering, and Wyoming Mineral.
-

4 -
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Those material to this appeal are:
COUNT I -- MECHANIC'S LIBN PORBCLOSURB (agalnat
Wyoming Mineral Corporation (•wyoming Mineral•), lea8ee of
the real property) •

Plaintiff is entitled to have ita

mechanic's lien foreclosed, if necessary, to secure
payment of its claims.
COUNT II -- MONEY DUE AND OWING (agaist U.S.
Construction).

u.s.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover the

~ney

Construction owes it for its work on the project.
COUNT IV -- BREACH OF CONTRACT (against U.S.

Construction) •
for

u.s.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover daaages

Contruction's many breaches of contract,

including failure to deliver the structural steel to the
job site, failure to deliver proper steel, failure to
deliver the structual steel in proper sequence, failure to
paint the structural steel properly, failure to identify
the structural steel, obliteration of identification
markings on the structural steel, and interference with
the orderly prosecution of plaintiff's work on the project.
COUNT V -- BREACH OF CONTRACT (against Wyoming
Mineral and its agent Jacobs Engineering).

Plaintiff is

entitled to recover damages from Wyoming Mineral and its
agent, Jacobs Engineering, caused by Jacobs' failure to
coordinate and manage the project.
COUNT VI -- MONEY DUE AND OWING (against Wyoming
Mineral, Jacobs Engineering and u.s. Construction)·
- 5 -
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Plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value of
the services performed and materials it supplied at the
instance of the defendants on the project.
In the lower court, defendants did not seriously
dispute that plaintiff incurred many thousands of dollars
of excess costs on the project.

The dispute is over

whether plaintiff is barred from recovering his excess
costs by reason of the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction, waiver, or by provisions of the
subcontract.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on

the ground that plaintiff, under one of these theories,
was barred from recovering its excess costs.
126-127).

(R.

Although the Record is silent as to the reason

the lower court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the only issue argued orally at any length was
that of accord and satisfaction.

(R. 215-216).

Plaintiff formally executed its subcontract with

u.s.

Construction (the general contractor) on April ll,

1977 (R. 237, ex. D-6), and began work on May 12, 1977.
(R. 237, ex. D-35).

Plaintiff began to incur unforseen

costs early on, and gave

u.s.

Construction prompt and

detailed notice of those costs.
plaintiff sent

u.s.

On June 29, 1977,

Construction an invoice for excess

costs incurred from May 19, 1977 to June 24, 1977 and
provided a detailed breakdown of the reasons for these
costs and the amount of each.

The excess costs to that
- 6 -
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date were $4,660.00.

(R. 237, ex. D-9).

At tbe ....

time, plaintiff submitted an invoice for the first regular
payment under its subcontract in the amount of ,l,tOO.OO,
and was paid that amount by a check dated July 13, 1977.
(R. 237, ex. D-8).

On July 28, 1977, plaintiff submitted a second
invoice for excess costs, again itemized in detail.

This

invoice represented excess costs incurred between June 27
and July 15, 1977 of $6,560.11.

(R. 237, ex. D-10).

Approximately 10 days later, on August 8, 1977, plaintiff
submitted a third itemized invoice to

u.s.

Construction

for excess costs incurred during the balance of July.
This invoice amounted to $6,632.64.

(R. 237, ex. D-11).

On that same day, plaintiff, obviously realizing
that excess costs from delay and interference were going
to continue throughout the project, submitted to U.S.
Construction a formal "Request for Extra Work
Authorization and Extension of Time."
D-12).

(R. 237, ex.

The request stated that excess costs had been

incurred through July in the amount of $19,892.75, and
estimated that an additional $35,173.00 would occur prior
to completion of the project.
On August 22, 1977, a meeting was held between
plaintiff, U.S. Construction, and Jacobs Engineering at
which plaintiff's excess costs were discussed.

- 7 -

In
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response to that meeting, plaintiff submitted to

u.s.

Construction a formal request that plaintiff be paid the
contract price for work done under the contract until
August 12, 1977, that plaintiff be paid an additional
$35,775.00 to compensate it for excess costs incurred to
that date, and that plaintiff complete the project on a
unit-price basis.

(R. 237, ex. D-16, D-17, D-18).

Plaintiff submitted additional invoices to

u.s.

Construction between August 29, 1977 and September 30,
1977 documenting and requesting additional payment for its
excess costs during that period.
D-23, D-24, D-29).

(R. 237, ex. D-21, D-22,

Ultimately, plaintiff submitted a

schedule documenting every dollar of its excess costs.
(R. 237, ex. D-34).
While

u.s.

Construction was receiving plaintiff's

documented invoices for excess costs,

u.s.

Construction

made four payments to plaintiff by means of checks
containing restrictive endorsements, and accompanied three
of the checks with a separate printed "Waiver of Lien"
form.

(R. 237, ex. D-7, D-8, D-14, D-15, D-30).

It is

these checks and lien waivers that constitute the basis of
defendants' claim that plaintiff waived its right to
recover excess costs, or that plaintiff and U.S.
Construction reached an accord and satisfaction
discharging them.

(The four checks are attached to this

Brief as an appendix.)
- 8 -
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Plaintiff received the first sucb cbeck (R. 237, ez. D-8)
on July 19, 1977 after submitting an invoice for tbe first contract
payment of $1,400.00 and the first invoice for ezcees costa in tbe
amount of an additional $4,660.00.

(R. 237, ex. D-9).

Tbe cbeck

plaintiff received was in the amount of $1,400.00, the firat pay.ent
undisputedly due under the subcontract, and included nothing for any
of the excess costs plaintiff had invoiced.

On the face of the

check, u.s. Construction typed the words, •1st draw on Wyo.ing
Minerals."

On the reverse side of the check appears the

printed-form restrictive endorsement that provides, in full:
Endorsement of this check acknowledges
payment in full for all labor and/or
materials and/or equipment furnished to date
by payee and any subcontractors thereof
toward construction and improvements on the
property described on the face of this
instrument and the undersigned hereby waives
all lien rights in respect to such labor
and/or materials and/or equipment heretofore
performed or furnished, and the undersigned
payee further acknowledges and guarantees
that this payment is in full satisfaction of
all labor, laborers and suppliers of labor
and/or materials of said premises performed
prior to this date and shall hold the payor
harmless against any claims for labor or
materials so furnished. Payee further
acknowledges and warrants that the labor or
material for which payment is received
hereby was actually performed or furnished
by the person or persons receiving payment
therefore.
This instrument may not be negotiated until
dated and signed by payee(s).
This check was endorsed by Denise H. Wood, an employee of
· t ed.
plaintiff, and negot1a

u.s. Construction required her

to sign an accompanying "Waiver of Lien" (R. 237, ex.
D-7), in addition, that provided, in full:
- 9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I, the undersigned Allen-Howe Specialties
Corporation in consideration of the sum of
•1st Draw paid to me, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, hereby waive and
release all lien or right of lien now
existing or that may hereafter arise for
work or labor performed, or materials
furnished on or before the 30th day of June,
1977, for the improvement of the following
described property situated in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, to-wit:
Wyoming Minerals
9090 Bingham Highway
Cooperton, Utah
And I further agree to furnish a good and
sufficient waiver of lien on said premises
from every person or persons or corporation
furnishing labor or materials for said
premises, who may be acting under any
contract with me.
The second check (R. 237, ex. D-14) was dated
August 9, 1977.
Lien.

It too is accompanied by a Waiver of

(R. 237, ex. D-13).

W. C. Howe, Jr., the president

of plaintiff, personally called at U.S. Construction's
office to pick up the check.
president of

u.s.

Patricia Platts, whom the

Construction characterized as

u.s.

Construction's secretary-administrator (R. 238 at 28),
presented Mr. Howe with the check and the printed Waiver
of Lien.

Mr. Howe told Mrs. Platts that he had not been

paid for very substantial excess costs, and that he would
not sign a lien waiver purporting to waive his lien rights
with respect to his excess costs.

In the presence and

full view of Mrs. Platts, Mr. Howe then struck the work
"all" and interlineated "partial" so that the Waiver of

- 10 -
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Lien reflected a partial, rather than full, waiver of lien
for work and materials through July 29, 1977.
63-64; R. 238 at 29-30).

(R. 236 at

He then asked Mrs. Platts to

make a photocopy of the Waiver of Lien, as changed, for
him.

She did so, released the check to him, and he

departed.

(R. 236 at 63-64).

The check was drawn in the amount of S24,657.40
which was the contract amount undisputedly due plus a
small amount for contract extras that
admitted it owed.

u.s.

Construction

It included nothing for any of

plaintiff's excess costs that

u.s.

Construction disputed.

It contained the same restrictive endorsement as the
previous check.

Mr. Howe took the check to

u.s.

Construction's bank, and asked to speak with a bank
officer.

He showed the check and the lien waiver, as

changed, to a Mr. Robert Chatfield, who gave him
permission to change the restrictive endorsement on the
check by interlineating the work "partial• in place of
"full" to correspond with the Waiver of Lien.
Mr. Chatfield then issued Mr. Howe a cashier's check.

(R.

236 at 74).

u.s.

Construction issued its third check to

plaintiff on September 7, 1977, a month later,
amount of $9,606.96.

(R. 237, ex. D-15).

in the

This check is

signed by Patricia L. Platts, the same person who released
the second check to Mr. Howe after witnessing his
- ll Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8Dd1f1cation of the Waiver of Lien.

Mr. Howe followed the

.... procedure with respect to the third check.

be

picked up the check personally at

u.s.

That is,

Construction's

office, aade the same change on the lien waiver that
accoapanied it, took the check to

u.s.

Construction's bank

and, with the peraission of a bank officer,
correspondingly changed the restrictive endorsement on the
cbeck.

(R. 236 at 80).

This check contains

u.s.

Construction's typewritten notation on the face:

"Payment

on contract work for steel erection at Wyoming Minerals
No. 114.•
Mr. Howe received the fourth and final monthly
check on October 11, 1977 in the amount of $17,627.64.
(R. 237, ex. D-30).

This time, Mr. Howe picked up the

check personally from James P. Jensen, the president of
U.S. Construction.

Mr. Jensen did not ask Mr. Howe to

sign the usual "Waiver of Lien" form: he merely released
the check.
the check to

Mr. Howe followed the same procedure of taking

u.s.

COnstruction's bank, and, with the

permission of an officer, modifying the restrictive
endorsement.

(R. 236 at 92-94).

After considerable discussion among Jacobs
Engineering, U.S. Construction and plaintiff regarding the
delays and ineffeciencies in the project and plaintiff's
resulting excess costs,

u.s.

Construction, on November 3,

1977, tendered to plaintiff a check in the amount of
- 12 -
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$10,623.25 in full settlement of all of plaintiff's claias
for excess costs.

(R. 237, ex. D-32).

Mr. Hove refused

to accept the check in full settlement of its claia for
excess costs, and returned it to
letter so stating.

u.s.

Construction with a

(R. 237, ex. D-33).
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ENTERING A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS WHEN THE RECORD
FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND WHERE
CRUCIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED.
A.

This Court Has Repeatedly Stressed The
Fundamental Rule That Any Material Issue of
Fact Is An Absolute Bar To Summary Judgment.

The district court, in granting defendants'
motion for summary judgment, ignored the stringent
standards imposed by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and this Court's interpretation of that rule.
Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there are no genuine issues
as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
(emphasis supplied)
This rule, by its literal terms, places on the moving
party the great burden of demonstrating the absence of any
material issues of fact.

Wright & Miller in their

treatise neatly summarize the difficulty moving parties
have in meeting this "burden of demonstrating":

- l3 -
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It is well-settled that the party moving for
judgment has the burden of
de.onstrating that the Rule S6(c) test - •no
genuine issue as to any material fact" - is
satisfied and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The movant is
held to a stringent standard. Before
summary judgment will be granted, it must be
clear what the truth is and any doubt as to
the existence of a enuine issue of material
act w 1 be resolved against the movant.
The burden is on the movant, the evidence
presented to the court always is construed
in favor of the party opposing the motion
and he is given the benefit of all favorable
inferences that can be drawn from it.
Finally, the facts asserted by the party
opposing the motion, if supported by
affidavits or other evidentiary material,
are regarded to be true.
(emphasis supplied)
s~ary

10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure:

Civil S

2727 at 524-30 (1973) and authorities cited therein.

This

Court has repeatededly expressed similar, if not
identical, sentiments regarding the caution with which the
district courts should approach the summary judgment
procedure.
For example, the cases in this state are legion
that echo the following statement from Bullock v. Deseret
Dodge Truck Centers, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559, 561
( 1960):
A summary judgment must be supported by
evidence, admissions and inferences which,
when viewed in the light most favorable to
the loser shows that; there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Such showing must preclude
all reasonable possibility that the loser
could, if given a trial, produce evidence
which would reasonably sustain a judgment in
his favor.
(emphasis supplied)
- 14
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Strand v. Mayne 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396, 397 (1963)
(summary judgment a •harsh

remedy·~

should be granted only

when viewing evidence in light most favorable to
non-moving party •it is evident beyond a reasonable
possibility that if given a trial he could not produce
evidence to sustain a judgment more favorable to hia.•)r
Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d
1274 (1973)

1

Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 14 Utah

2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010 (1963); Frederick May' Co. v. Dunn,
13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962): Green v. Garn, ll Utah
2d 375, 359 P. 2d 1050 (1961).
B.

Summary Judgment Is Unjustified on This Record.

The Record shows that defendants are not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and, in addition, contains
many material controverted issues of fact.

Defendants are

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the
accord and satisfaction they assert lacks consideration.
Even if this lack of consideration were no hurdle,
defendants would still not be entitled to summary judgment
because the following controverted material issues of fact
appear in the Record:

(1) Whether the checks tendered by

U.S. Construction were tendered upon the condition that
they be received in full satisfaction of plaintiff's claim
for additional compensation; (2) Whether Patricia L.
Platts (the employee of u.s. Construction who released two
checks to plaintiff knowing that plaintiff did not agree
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to the printed restictive endorsement) had authority to

80dify tbe condition on which the checks were tendered;
and (3) Whether plaintiff knew or should have known that
the check• were tendered by

u.s.

Construction upon the

condition that they be received in full satisfaction of
plaintiff's claim for additional compensation;

(4) Whether

the work plaintiff performed was so different that it
appeared at the bidding stage that plaintiff is entitled
to recover in quantum meruit and is therefore not subject
to defenses based on the contract.
II.

THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION DEFENDANTS ASSERT
LACKS CONSIDERATION.
An accord and satisfaction is, in essence, a

contract to settle a aispute or discharge a claim
accompanied by a performance of the contract.

Like any

other contract, an accord must be based upon an offer,
acceptance of the offer, and must be supported by legal
consideration.
~·

Cannon v. Stevens School of Business,

560 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977); Pace v. Pace, 559

P.2d 964, 967 (Utah 1977); F.M.A. Financial Corp. v.
Build, Inc., l7 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 672-673 (1975).
See generally 6 Corbin on Contracts Sl279 (1962).
The accord and satisfaction defendants assert is
unsupported by any consideration, and therefore is a
nullity.

The invoices plaintiff submitted to

u.s.

Construction during the course of the project fall into
three categories:

(l) claims for progress payments
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undisputedly due under the subcontract, (2) clai•• for
additional compensation that

u.s.

Construction adaitted it

owed, and (3) claims for additional compensation that
Construction disputed.

u.s.

In order to constitute

consideration for an accord and satisfaction discharging
plaintiff's disputed claims,

u.s.

Construction would have

been required to give plaintiff some payment or other
consideration over and above what U.S. Construction was
obligated to pay for the undisputed claims.

To this day,

plaintiff has not received one penny for any of the
disputed claims.

Indeed, U.S. Construction has not even

paid plaintiff all of what U.S. Construction admits it
owes.

(R.

104-105).

Under Utah law, it is clear that if a debtor pays
a creditor no more than the debtor is obligated to pay, an
accord and satisfaction founded upon the payment will fail
for want of consideration.

As this Court has stated:

The general rule, and the rule which this
Court has followed, is that where a claim
for a definite and undisputed amount which
is past due, an agreement by the creditor
. . . to take a lesser amount, which is
paid, does not discharge the whole debt.
This is so because the creditor receives
only what he is entitled to and there is no
consideration for the new agreement.
(emphasis added)
F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404
p. 2d 6 7 0,

6 7 2-6 73

( 19 6 5) •

This Court has more recently stated:
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Ordinarily, the payment of part of a debt
does not discharge it; and this is true even
though the paying debtor exacts a promise
that it will do so. The reason for this is
tbat in making the part payment, the debtor
is doing nothing more than he is legally
obligated to do, and therefore he gives the
creditor no consideration for the promise
that the art a ment will be acce ted to
scharge the entire debt.
(emphasis added)
Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228,
1229 (Utah 1975).

This rule is often summarized by

stating that part payment of an undisputed and liquidated
debt furnishes no consideration for an agreement to
discharge the entire indebtedness.
A refinement of this rule is applicable to the
present case.

Plaintiff's claim did not consist of one

undisputed and liquidated sum, but, rather, was one claim
composed of two parts:

a liquidated, undisputed part that

U.S. Construction admitted it owed, and a disputed part
that U.S. Construction denied it owed.

U.S. Construction

paid only on the part it admitted it owed; it paid nothing
at all for the disputed part.
The courts of a number of other states have
confronted this problem and held that unless the creditor
pays something for the disputed part of the claim, there
can be no accord and satisfaction for the disputed part.
In Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co. v. Seattle-Tacoma
Power Co., 63 Wash. 639, 116 P. 289 (1911), a railway
agreed to purchase electricity at a stated rate from a
power company, and to pay a minimum of $1,000 per month.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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A dispute soon arose, with the power company c1aiaing tbat
it was entitled to something more than $1,000 per .ontb,
and the railway claiming that only the minimum of ,1,000
per month was due.

The railway began tendering ita

monthly check for $1,000 on condition that it be accepted
in full payment for electricity that month.

The power

company endorsed and negotiated the checks.
The court held that the railway's payment only of
the undisputed part of the debt was insufficient, aa a
matter of law, to constitute an accord and satisfaction:
We cannot conceive, under these facta, how
the payment of $1,000 each month by the
railway company and its receipt by the power
company, under the conditions indicated in
the payment and receipt, could operate as an
accord and satisfaction. There was no
dispute between the parties but that, under
any construction of the contract, $1,000 was
due each month. That sum was liquidated
It was not, therefore, the payment of
a smaller amount as full payment for a
larger amount.
This decision has been repeatedly cited and followed in
more recent cases.

Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wash. 2d 818, 226

P. 2d 218 (1951); Graham v. New York Life Ins. Co., 182
Wash. 612, 47 P.2d 1029 (1935); Seattle Investors
Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores of Wash., 177 Wash.
125, 30 P.2d 956 (1934); Field Lumber Co. v. Petty, 9
Wash. App. 378, 512 P.2d 764 (1973).
In a long line of cases, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has reached the same result on
facts very similar to those of the present case.

In
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MacDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 156 N.E. 740

(1927), a contractor agreed to construct a garage for the
sua of 110,000.

The contractor incurred extra costs as a

result of changes in the job during construction and made
a claia for those costs.

The building owner responded by

tendering the unpaid balance of the $10,000 contract price
on condition that it be received in full satisfaction of
all of the contractor's claims.
The court ruled that the payment of the $10,000
admittedly due furnished no consideration to support an
accord and satisfaction of the disputed claim for extras.
Numerous other decisions in Massachusetts, including one
recent decision, have cited ana applied MacDonald v.
Kavanaugh.
N.E.

Russell v. Bond & Goodwin, 276 Mass. 458, 177

627 (1931), Shumaker v. Lucerne-In-Maine Commun1ty

Ass'n, 275 Mass. 201, 175 N.E. 469 (1931); Whittaker Cnain
Tread Co. v. Standara Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass.
N.E.

204, 103

695 (1913); Longo Electrical Co., Inc. v. Dumais, l

Mass. App. 830, 297 N.E.2d 71

(1973).

The New Mexico Supreme Court has reached the same
result.

In Buel v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,

32 N.M. 34,

250 P. 635 (1926), a double indemnity lite insurance
policy was in torce.

The policy paid $2,000 upon the

death of the insured by any cause, but pa1d $4,000 if the
insured died from an accident.

A Ols?ute arose between

the benefic1ary and the company over whether the deatn was
- 20
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accidental.

The insurance company tenaered the $2,000

undisputedly due upon condition that the beneficiary
acknowledge full satisfaction of his claim.

The

beneficiary acquiesced, and the insurance company clai•ed
that an accord and satisfaction has been reached.

The

court, however, rejected the claim of accord and
satisfaction on the ground that the insurance company had
paid only what it admitted it owed, and gave no
consideration to support an accord and satisfaction with
respect to the amount in dispute.

The New Mexico Supreme

Court recently cited Buel approvingly in Clark Leasing
Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451,
535 P.2d 1077 (1975).

Accord, American Life Ins. Co. v.

Williams, 234 Ala. 469, 175 So. 554, 112 A.L.R. 1215
(1930).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also adopted this
view.

In Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Creek Cotton Oil

Co., 96 Okla. 189, 221 P. 499 (1923), some cotton was
destroyed and its owner filed a claim to recover under an
insurance polcy for the loss.

The insurance company

admitted liability for part of the cotton but denied any
obligation for the rest.

The company then issued a check

for the cotton undisputedly covered by the policy, but
tendered it on condition that 1t be received in full
satisfaction of all claims arising out of the loss.
The court held that there was no consideration to
support an accord ana sat1sfaction of the disputed part of
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tbe claia.

Aa a later Oklahoma decision explained,

the

court in co. .ercial Union held that
where a demand may be separated, a port1on
liquidated and a portion unliquidated, a
payment and acceptance and discharge of the
liquidated amount is not a satisfaction of
the unliquidated claim, unless it be made on
some new consideration • • •
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richter, 173 Okla. 489, 49
P.2d 94, 97 (1935).

Accord, Walker v. Ellinghausen, 309

P.2d lOSS (Okla. 1957).
The decisions of this Court agree with the
decisions cited above that an accord and satisfaction
lacks consideration -- and is a nullity -- when a debtor
attempts to discharge an entire obligation by paying only
the amount that he admits he owes.

The basic rule, to

which this Court unquestionably adheres, is that an accord
and satisfaction requires consideration, and that
consideration is lacking if the debtor does no more than
he is obligated to do.

Tates, Inc. v. Little America

Refining Co., S35 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1975)

("in making the

part payment, the debtor is doing nothing more than he is
legally obligated to do, and therefore he gives the
creditor no consideration . . . . "); F.M.A. Financial
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 672-673
(1965)

("the creditor receives only what he is entitled to

and there is no consideration for the new agreement");
Browning v. Equitable Llfe Assur. Society,

94 Utah 532,

- 22
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72

P.2d 1060, 1068 (1937) (•where the claim is definite and
no dispute but an admittance of its owing, the agree. .nt
to take a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction ia
not good unless attended by some consideration•).
The refinement of this basic rule -- that the
payment of only the undisputed part of a claim does not
discharge the disputed part -- has come before this Court
twice, and on both occasions this Court has refused to
find an accord and satisfaction.

In Bennett v. Robinson's

Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966), a
salesman who had worked on a commission basis terminated
his employment.

Upon his termination, the employer

presented him with a check tendered on condition that it
be received in full satisfaction of all outstanding
commissions.

The salesman endorsed and negotiated it.

The salesman's claim consisted of two parts:
commissions that were admittedly due, and commissions over
which there was some dispute.

The employer paid him only

for the undisputed amount of the commissions, and gave him
nothing as consideration for surrendering his claim to the
disputed sum.

In finding no accord and satisfaction, this

Court said:
He was unquestionably entitled to the money
he did receive; and the dispute was as to
whether he had more coming. The dispute
negates any accord; and under the facts
found by the trial court the [salesman)
could not equitably be precluded from
asserting his further claim.
- 23
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1!• at tl7
!!!• cited
Dill!fn

P.2d 764.

Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart,

and approved an earlier decision of this Court,

v. Maaaey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d

296 (1962) •
In Dillaan, the Massey Ferguson Company decided
to

te~inate

Dillman's equipment dealership.

Dillman

agreed to a voluntary termination if Massey Ferguson would
repurchase his parts inventory.

Massey Ferguson sent a

truck to the dealership and picked up all of the parts.
upon inspecting the parts, however, Massey
Ferguson decided to reject some and return them to
Dillman.

It then sent Dillman a check for only the value

of the parts it accepted and tendered the check on
condition that it be received as "the amount due in full
to complete recent buy-back on your account."

Massey

Ferguson paid Dillman nothing for the items it disputed.
This court refused to find an accord and satisfaction:
There was no dispute as to the amount due
for those items [that were accepted] and
therefore it cannot be contended that the
cashing of the check paying for such items
constituted and accord and satisfaction of a
dispute as to whether [Massey Ferguson]
breached an agreement to buy back other
items it had rejected . . . .
Id. at 369 P.2d 298.
The case now before this Court is closely
analagous to these prior Utah decisions, and almost
precisely on point with the decisions from otner states
cited above.

U.S. Construction paid plaint1ff only part
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of what it admitted it owed, and gave plaintiff no
consideration whatever for the compromise of the disputed
part of plaintiff's claim.

u.s.

Construction now asserts

that plaintiff, by receiving the money to which it was
undisputedly entitled, consented to an accord and
satisfaction with respect to the disputed items.

u.s.

Construction is attempting to subject plaintiff to what
Professors White and Summers in their leading hornbook on
the Uniform Commercial Code have termed •an exquisite fora
of commercial torture . • • • " by tendering what is
undisputedly due "in full settlement• of all claims.

J.

White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code at 452
(1972).

U.S. Construction's conduct does not represent a

legitimate attempt to compromise a dispute7 rather it
seeks to blackmail plaintiff into surrendering his claias
in order to receive only what is undisputedly due.

This

Court has not condoned such conduct in the past.
Moreover, Utah's legislative policy, as reflected
by the enactment of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
rejects a debtor's attempt to inflict this "exquisite form
of commercial torture."

In transactions subject to the

Utah Uniform Commercial Code, a creditor may endorse and
negotiate a check tendered on condition and defy the
condition so long as he explicitly reserves his rights.
Utah Code Ann. §70A-l-207 (1953) provides:
A party who with explicit reservation of
rights performs or promises performance or
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aaaenta to performance in a manner demanded
or offered by the other party does not
thereby prejudice the rights reserved.
Such
words as •without prejudice,• •under
protest• or the like are sufficient.
!bla aectlon is uniformly construed to allow the cashing
of a check purportedly tendered in full settlement of all
clal••• and prevent an accord and satisfaction from
arlalng if the creditor indicates on the instrument that
be does not so regard it.

Clark Leasing Corp. v. White

Sanda Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077
(1975): Baillie Lumber Co., Inc. v. Kincaid Carolina
Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969).

By orally

protesting, and by striking the word "full" and
interlineating •partial" on three of the checks, plaintiff
clearly manifested his unwillingness to agree to an
accord, and reserved his rights.
Because plaintiff's subcontract was predominantly
for services, it is not governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code.
1974).

See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir.
The legislative policy the Utah Uniform Commercial

Code reflects, however, is clearly applicable to the
present case.

The legislative policy is in harmony with

the judicial decisions cited above -- a debtor may not
discharge the disputed part of a claim unless he is given
some consideration beyond what is undisputedly owing.
There are some decisions in other jurisdictions
that find consideration for an accord and satisfaction

- by26
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,
when a debtor pays only the undisputed part of a debt and
gives nothing for the disputed part.
A.L.R. 1219, 1225 (1938).

!!!

Annot., 112

The rationale of these

decisions is apparently that the creditor receives
consideration by obtaining that to which he is
undisputedly entitled without having to bring a lawsuit.
These decisions allow commercial blackmail.

The better

view, as expressed in the cases cited above (including two
decisions of this Court), requires the debtor to pay
something above what is undisputedly owing as
consideration for a legitimate compromise of a disputed
claim.

This Court should adhere to its prior decisions

and Utah's legislative policy and hold that the accord and
satisfaction defendants assert is a nullity for want of
consideration.
III.

PLAINTIFF NEVER ACTUALLY OR CONSTRUCTIVELY
AGREED TO AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
An accord is a contract and, as such, requires a

sufficient offer and acceptance to prove a meeting of the
minds.

See Pace v. Pace, 559 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah 1977).

In cases involving checks with restrictive endorsements,
the restrictive endorsement usually constitutes the offer
for an accord, and the cashing of the check with knowledge
of the condition upon which it is tendered constitutes
constructive acceptance of the offer.

Whether there was

offer and acceptance 1n the present case is clearly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8 ubject to disputed aaterial issues of fact that require
reveraal of the suaaary judgment entered below.
Defendants contend that four separate checks
constitute the accord and satisfaction in the present
caaa.

The first one (R. 237, ex. D-8), was received by

plaintiff on July 19, 1977.

The check and the

acca.panying lien waiver were signed without change by
Deni•e Wood, an employee of plaintiff.

If there had been

any consideration, plaintiff's receipt of that check would
probably constitute an accord and satisfaction for claims
through June 30, 1977, the period for which the check was
issued.
No actual or constructive assent to an accord may
be found in plaintiff's receipt of the other three checks,
however.

Plaintiff received the second check (R. 237, ex.

D-14) on August 10, 1977.

Plaintiff's president,

w. c.

Howe, Jr., called in person at U.S. Construction's office
to pick it up.

He read the all-encompassing lien-waiver

language and told Patricia Platts, the employee of U.S.
Construction who gave him the check, that he would not
sign it.

In her presence, he struck the term "full" from

the lien waiver and inserted the term "partial."

He then

asked Mrs. Platts to make him a copy of the lien waiver as
modified, which she did.

She then took the modified lien

waiver and released the check to nim.

Mr. Howe took the

check to the bank on which it was drawn, and, with the
- 28 -
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permission of an officer, changed the restrictive
endorsement to correspond with the lien waiver by striking
the word •full• and interlineating •partial.•

(R. 236 at

63-75; R. 238 at 29-31).
Plaintiff received a third check (R. 237, ex.
D-15) approximately one month later, on September 7,
1977.

He was presented with an accompanying lien waiver,

and followed the same procedure of changing the lien
waiver's restrictive endorsement and leaving the modified
lien waiver with the
him the check.

u.s.

Construction employee who gave

Then, as before, he took the check to

u.s.

Construction's bank and, with he permission of an officer,
modified the check to correspond to the lien waiver.

That

check is signed by Patricia L. Platts, the person who
released the prior check to Mr. Howe after he had refused
to agree to a full lien waiver.
Plaintiff received the fourth check (R. 237, ex.
D-30) on October 11, 1977.

Plaintiff received this check

directly from James P. Jensen, the president of U.S.
Construction.

The only difference in procedure was that

Mr. Jensen did not ask Mr. Howe to sign the usual separate
lien waiver.
It is undisputed that prior to receiving the
second, third and fourth checks, Mr. Howe told Patricia
Platts both verbally and in writing that he would not
agree to an accord discharging plaintiff's claim for
- provided
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additional coapensation.

When a creditor tells his debtor

that the condition upon which a check is tendered is
unacceptable, and the debtor nevertheless gives him the
check, no accord and satisfaction occurs.

For example, in

Moore' McCormack Co., Inc. v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 37 F.
2d 308 (4th Cir. 1930), a creditor, upon receiving a check
tendered in full satisfaction of a claim, informed the
debtor that it was being accepted as part payment only.
The creditor then told the debtor he should stop payment
on the check if he insisted that it be received in full
satisfaction.

The debtor did not stop payment on it, and

the court found no actual or constructive assent to an
accord and satisfaction.
Similarly, in Seattle, R. &

s.

Ry. Co. v. Seattle

-Tacoma Power Co., 63 Wash. 639, 116 P. 289, 290 (1911),
a railway company sent a check for $1,000 each month to a
power company and marked it in full satisfaction of all
claims.

Each month for approximately ten months, the

power company notified the railway that the check was
being received as part payment only.

In addition to

holding that the alleged accord and satisfaction lacked
consideration, the court observed that there could be no
accord and satisfaction because the railway knew that its
checks were not being received in full satisfaction.
In the present case, Patricia Platts knew that
plaintiff would not accept them in full satisfaction, but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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issued checks to plaintiff anyway.
authority to issue

u.s.

If Patricia Platta had

Construction checks to persona wbo

would not agree to the printed restrictive endoraeaent,
there can be no accord and satisfaction for want of actual
or constructive mutual assent.
The question of Patricia Platts' authority is a
material controverted issue of fact.

On the one hand, Mr.

Jensen, president of U.S. Construction, testified at his
depositin that Patricia Platts was merely a secretary
without authority to modify the conditions upon which a
U.S. Construction check was tendered.

(R. 238 at 42).

On

the other hand, Mr. Jensen characterized Patricia Platts
as a "secretary-administrator" and admitted that she was
in charge of collecting lien waivers and had express
authority to deliver checks upon collection of the lien
waivers.

(R. 238 at 29).

Indeed, the record reveals that

she was authorized to sign the very checks that were being
conditionally tendered to plaintiff.

Her signature

appears on the check dated September 7, 1977.

(R. 237,

ex. D-15).
Moreover, Patricia Platts had either implied or
apparent authority to modify the condition upon which the
checks were tendered.

After having watched Mr. Howe

modify a lien waiver on August 10, 1977, she not only
released a check to him on that date, but, a month later,
released another check to him, with an identical
- 31 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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80dification.

On October 11, 1977, after another month

had passed, Mr. Jensen,

u.s.

Construction's president

biaself released another check to plaintiff.

At no time

did plaintiff receive any objection to the repeated
aodifications.

u.s.

Construction cloaked Patricia Platts

with express authority to accept lien waivers, release
checks, and to sign checks.

(R. 238 at 29).

From

Mr. &owe's point of view, Patricia Platts certainly had
either implied or apparent authority to release checks
upon a modified condition.
Mr. Jensen's complaint is that his employee,
Patricia Platts, did not tell him that she had watched Mr.
Howe modify the conditional language and thereafter
released two checks to him.
plaintiff's fault.

(R. 238 at 31).

That is not

The modified lien waivers remained in

U.S. Construction's office, and Mr. Jensen could have
reviewed them at any time.

Plaintiff relied on the

authority with which U. S. Construction cloaked Mrs.
Platts.

Defendants will not be heard now to claim that

she had none.
At his deposition, Mr. Jensen testified that he
assumed that U.S. Construction
statements.

(R. 238 at 34).

received monthly bank
Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-406

(1953) places a duty on a depositor to examine its bank
statement within a reasonable time and to discover and
report unauthorized signature or alterations.

More than
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two months passed between the first modiciation of the
lien waiver and the issuance of the last check plaintiff
cashed.

If two months or less is a reasonable time within

which to inspect a bank statement,

u.s.

Contruction was on

constructive notice that plaintiff did not agree to the
printed restrictive endorsement before issuing the last
check.

Hence, another issue of fact appears in the Record.
Assuming that the accord and satisfaction

defendants assert did not lack consideration, defendants
would be entitled to a summary judgment barring
plaintiff's claims by reason of accord and satisfaction
only if the record contained undisputed facts establishing
the following:

(1) Patricia Platts had no actual or

apparent authority on behalf of

u.s.

Construction to

modify lien waivers or to release checks in return for
modified lien waivers;

(2) no person at

u.s.

Construction

who did have authority should reasonably have noticed the
modification of the lien waivers prior to issuing the
third and fourth checks to plaintiff; and (3) that two
months was not a reasonable time within which U.S.
Construction should have become aware of the modified
restrictive endorsement by virtue of its bank statement.
Because these facts are not established, the
Record presents a material dispute regarding plaintiff's
assent to an accord.

When the disputed facts are viewed

in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as they must be
- 33 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on 8 u.aary judg.ent, it is clear that plaintiff did not
actually or constructively assent to an accord with
re~ect

to plaintiff's claim for additional compensation.

The au..ary judgment entered below must be reversed so
that the factual conflict may be resolved.
IV.

THB CHECKS THAT DEFENDANTS ASSERT CONSTITUTE AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION DO NOT CLEARLY STATE
THE CONDITION UPON WHICH THEY WERE ALLEGEDLY
TENDERED.
It is well recognized, both in Utah and

elsewhere, that in order for a check to constitute an
accord and satisfaction, it must be unmistakably clear
that the check is tendered upon the condition that it be
accepted in full satisfaction of all claims, or not at
all.

Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d

1228, 1230 (1975)

("clearly appear").

As a Texas court

has stated:
The minds must meet and where resting in
implication the facts proved must
irresistaoly point to such conclusion.
There must be an unmistakable communication
to the creditor that the tender of the
lesser sum is upon the condition that
acceptance will constitute satisfaction of
the underlying obligation. Such condition
must be made plain, definite and certain and
must be so clear, full and explicit that it
is not susceptible of any other
interpretation.
Pickering v. First Greenville Nat'l hank, 495 S.W.2d
16, 19 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973).
This Court has stated on two occasions that
a check tendered on condition must not only clearly
- 34 -
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reveal the condition, but must also state that it is
to be returned and not cashed if the condition is
unacceptable.

In Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275,

437 P.2d 202 (1968), this Court refused to find an
accord and satisfaction when one party cashed a check
stating, "This is the balance of your account in
full" because the check did not state that it should
be returned if the condition were unacceptable;
(I]t is clear that there was no meeting of
the minds that the acceptance of the check
was to be in complete settlement of the
dispute. The voucher attached to the check
did not state that the money was to be
returned if it was not so accepted.
(emphasis added)
Id. at 437 P.2d 208.
This Court has followed the quoted language from
Hintze v. Seaich in a recent decision.

In Cannon v.

Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385
(1977), an employer sent a terminated salesman a check
contaiing the following language:
Endorsement of this check constitutes
acknowledge of the termination effective
12-31-73, of my Employment Agreement with
Stevens-Henager College dated [date], and
constitutes final and full payment by
Stevens-Henager College to me in settlement
of any and all obligations due me from
Stevens-Henager College.
This language was found insufficient, as a matter of law,
to constitute an accord and satisfaction:
Furthermore, neither by the statement on the
check nor by other communication did
defendant express the intention that the
payment was offered upon the condition it be
accepted in full satisfaction, or not at all.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Id. at 1386.

The opinion then quoted the language from

Hintze v. Seaich requiring the check to state that the
aoney was to be r.eturned if the condition were
unacceptable.

The checks

u.s.

Construction submitted to

plaintiff did not state that they should be returned if
the restrictive endorsement were unacceptable.
Moreover, the all-encompassing language of the
restrictive endorsement on the

u.s.

Construction checks

conflicts with language typed on the face of the checks.
The first check (R. 237, ex. D-8) shows on its face in
typed language (and typing prevails over printing) that it
is only intended to pay the first draw on the
subcontract.

The second check (R. 237, ex. D-14) shows

that it is intended only as a progress payment and as
payment of certain invoices.

The third check (R. 237, ex.

D-15) is on its face only intended to cover "contract
work."

The fourth check (R. 237, ex. D-30) states it is

intended to cover all the Wyoming Mineral contract less
retention.

On none of these check is there any suggestion

that disputed items are being wholly or partially paid.
At a minimum, a comparison of the front and back of these
checks give rise to a factual issue -- that is, what was
the intent of the parties that these checks pay for?

The

language of the checks certainly falls far short of the
unmistakable, clear and explicit language required before
a court may find an accord and satisfaction.
- by
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V.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT WAIVED OR PROMISBD TO
ITS CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION

~IVB

Defendants argued below that by accepting
Construction's checks and signing

u.s.

u.s.

Construction's lien

waivers, plaintiff waived its claim for additioanl
compensation.

A waiver •is the voluntary and intentional

relinquishment of a known right, claim, or privilege.•
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver 5154 (1966).

28

•To constitue

a waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention
to relinquish it.

It must be distinctly made although it

may be express or implied."

Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90

Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 311-312 (1936).
The Record shows that plaintiff never
voluntarily relinquished its claim for additional
compensation.

On the contrary, plaintiff sent U.S.

Construction numerous invoices for excess costs both
before and after receiving its checks, and when
plaintiff's president received the checks, he carefully
modified the Waiver of Lien froms and restrictive
endorsements to reflect a lien waiver only for payment
actually received.
offers by

In addition, plaintiff rejected two

u.s. Construction to compromise its claims for

additional compensation.

U.S. Construction first offered

plaintiff $3,000 in additional compensation, and later
tendered a check in the amount of $10,623.25

- 37 -
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t4,702.2S for additional compensation.

Plaintiff rejected

both.

(R. 238 at 12Si R. 237, ex. D-32, D-33).

Record

si~ly

The

does not establish a voluntary

relinquishment of plaintiff's claims.
This Court has held that a contractor's release
or waiver of his claims based upon his acceptance of
conditionally tendered checks stands on the same footing
as an accord and satisfaction

that is, it requires

autual assent and consideration.

Roberts Investment Co.

v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products Co., 22 Utah 2d 105,
449 P.2d 116 (1969).

Defendants are thus precluded from

asserting that although plaintiff's receipt of

u.s.

Construction's checks does not constitute an accord and
satisfaction, it may constitute a waiver.

Plaintiff

neither agreed to an accord and satisfaction nor waived
its claim for additional compensation.
VI.

PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION.
A.

The Contract Expressly Recognizes Claims For
Interference, Delay, Changes and Extras.

The subcontract between plaintiff and

u.s.

Construction expressly recognizes the right of plaintiff
to receive additional compensation on account of delay or
interference:
Section 6.
In the event that the
Subcontractor's performance of this
subcontract is delayed or interferred with
by acts of the Owner, Contractor or other
subcontractor, he may request an extension
-

38 -
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of time for the performance of same, as
hereinafter provided, but shall not be
entitled to any increase in the subcontract
price or to damages or additional
compensation as a consequence of such delay
except to the extent that Contractor is
entitled to receive an increase in contract
price from the Owner.
(emphasis supplied)
(R. 237, ex. D-6).

In the district court, defendants

asserted that this language bars plaintiff's claims,
insofar as they arise out of delay and interference, and
urged it as a ground for seeking summary judgment.
102-104).

(R.

It does not, however, bar a claim for delay or

interference.

On the contrary, Section 6 expressly

recognizes that plaintiff may recover on account of delay
and interference to the same extent that

u.s.

COnstruction

is entitled to receive additional compensation from
Wyoming Mineral.
The contract between

u.s.

Construction and

Wyoming Mineral is incorporated by reference into
plaintiff's subcontract.
The

u.s.

(R. 237, ex. D-6, Section 1).

Construction-Wyoming Mineral general contract, in

General Conditions-A, provides the mechanism by which U.S.
Construction could receive additional compensation on
account of interference:
9.

Simultaneous Work by Others.

(a} . . . The Contractor shall make every
reasonable effort to perform its work
hereunder in such manner as to enable both
the work under this contract and such other
work to be completed without hindrance or
interference from each other. Any claim of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Contractor arising out of any alleged
interference due to the conduct of such
other work shall be made to the Owner in
writing within five (5) days of the
occurrence of the alleged interference and
shall be deemed to have been waived unless
ao aade.

(R. 238, ex. D-52).

u.s.

Construction also has a contractual right to

recover from the owner in the event it incurs additional
costs as a result of changes or extras.

In the event of a

diapute regarding whether work required to be done is
extra to the contract,

u.s.

Construction's contract with

Wyoming Mineral, in General Conditions-A, provides:
(c) • • • The Contractor shall, within five
(5) days after its notice of such direction,
submit to the Owner a written request for
the issuance of a written change order.
Upon receipt by the Owner of any such
notice, the parties shall endeavor to agree
as to whether the direction in question
constitutes an order for a change in the
work and as to the equitable adjustment, if
any, to be made.
If agreement cannot be
reached, the Contractor shall promptly
proceed with the work involved.
The cost of
such work shall then be determined by the
Owner's Representative on the basis of the
Contractor's reasonable expenditures and
savings, including, in the case of an
increase in the contract sum, a reasonable
allowance for overhead and profit.
(emphasis supplied)
No matter whether the circumstances resulting in
plaintiff's excess costs are characterized as interference
and delay, on the one hand, or changes and extras, on the
other, the contractual provisions prov1de a mechanism by
which both plaintiff and U.S. Construction may become
- 40
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entitled to additional compensation.

u.s.

Plaintiff inforaea

Construction in a timely manner of its excess costs,

the reason it was incurring excess costs, and deaanded
additional compensation.

Plaintiff sent

u.s.

Construction

detailed invoices on June 29, 1977, July 28, 1977, August
8, 1977, August 29, 1977, August 31, 1977, and Septeaber
30, 1977.

(R. 237, ex. D-9, D-10, 0-11, 0-21, 0-22, D-23,

D-24, D-27, D-29).

Furthermore,

u.s.

Construction's

representatives, including a field superintendent, were on
the job regularly and aware of the situation.
20, 86-87).

(R. 238 at

Thus, the contracts in force contemplate

and clearly do not exclude -- additional compensation to a
subcontractor, whether for interference, changes or extras.
B.

Whether Plaintiff's Claim Falls Under the
Contract or Rests in Quantum Meruit Depends
Upon the Resolution of a Disputed Issue of
Fact.

It is not clear from the Record whether
plaintiff's claims fall within the scope of the contract
-- and are thus subject to contractual defenses

or

whether they fall outside of the contract and thus outside
of any contractual defense that defendants may raise.

It

has long been recognized in Utah that when the work a
contractor actually performs turns out to be substantially
different than it appeared at the bidding stage, the
contractor may recover in quantum meruit for his work
beyond the scope of the contract.

Wunderlich Contracting
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Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 201 (lOth Cir. 1957)
(applying Utah law)1 Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 F. 457
(8th Cir. 1900)

(applying Utah law).

Plaintiff's claim is

for additional compensation of more than $64,000 on a job
with a contract price of $53,372.

(R. 237, ex. D-6).

Plaintiff's claim raises a factual question whether the
work performed, because of delay, interference and

u.s.

Construction's mistakes, was so substantially different
than contemplated at the bidding stage that pla1ntiff is
entitled to recover in quantum meruit rather than under
the contract.

If so, defendant's contractual defenses are

inapplicable.

Hence, the contractual provisions afford no

basis at all for sustaining the summary judgment entered
below.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment entered below dismissing all
of plaintiff's claims for additional compensation on the
uranium extraction facility project was manifestly
improper.

Insofar as the district court ruled that

plaintiff's claims are barred by an accord and
satisfaction it not only erred on the law -- because the
accord and satisfaction defendants assert lacks
consideration -- out overlooked the numerous material
issues of fact regard1ng the cond1tion, 1f any, upon which
checks were tendered to plaintiff, whether plaintiff

- by
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•
actually or constructively assented to the condition, and
whether the condition, if any, was modified.
Insofar as the district court ruled that
plaintiff's claims are barred by contractual defenses it
erred on the law -- because the contract expressly
recognizes a subcontractor's claims for additional
compensation -- and overlooked the material issue of fact
of whether the work plaintiff did was so different from
that contemplated that plaintiff is entitled to recover in
guantum meruit instead of under the contract.

On this

Record, depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to have ita
evidence on these questions heard by a trier of fact would
be a great injustice.

This action must be remanded to the

district court for trial.
Respectfully submitted,

0~~~
w. B!lli~

Peter

Warren Patten
Charles B. Casper
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
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WAIVER OF LIEN
iTO ..~:... ~:... ~~~~~~~-~!.~~~.! ...~-~-~:L.~.!...~?.!-:~-~--~~~--~~~-~.1 ...~.~-~ La'lte City, Utah

84116

I, the undersigned ..... M ~ !m:: JJ~.fi!...l;;P.e.c.h.lti u .. C9rp9.ra..t.ion .................................................,
in consideration of the sum of $.~~ •. 657. .. ~0 ..... paid rome, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledpd.
hereby waive and re\fl"ase ~I lien or right of lien now existing or that may hereafter arise fex work ex labor
I ..Jf.l. 1-v. •1::4
.
performed, or Materials "i~nished on or before th~ ...7.9.t.'h ....day of...........J.\1.1-Y......................, 19.7.7.....

lor the improvement of the following described property siruated in ................. Salt.. Lake. ..........Counl)',

Srare of ........ JJ.t~............................... , to-wit:
············-~·0·~-~.S. ..~-~~~~~!i .. ~~:r:P.~!~~-~-C?~...................................................................................
. ..............~_0_9_~---~·i·~-~~.B:~ ..H.~~~~~Y. ...................................................................................................
.................... .COpper-ton, ... Ut.ah ........................................................................................................... ..
And I further agree to furnish a good and sufficient waiver ol lien on said premises from every person ex
persons or. corporation furnishing labor or_ materials~r said premises, who may _be acting under any

'-~~-~~-~2~~l:;:>t.·. . . 19.7.7...

........

q. ~~~~. -.jt~y:fl~:-::~t~---~1-~-.f:. ........................

I hereby certify that the labor or material, or l;>oth, receipted for above was acrually performed, ex

used, at the above described property.
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